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Abstract This article examines some of the characteristic features of
environmental offences, in particular the ways in which these offences
and their treatment in the courts deviate from general principles of
criminal law. Despite the fact that environmental offences are often
labelled as ‘quasi-criminal’, there has been long-standing criticism of
penalties, particularly the low level of fines in magistrates’ courts. The
article also considers the possible reasons behind this and argues that, as
well as the inexperience of lay magistrates, the perception of environ-
mental crime, fuelled by the strict liability nature of most environmental
offences, is a significant factor. The recent introduction of civil sanctions is
evaluated along with recommendations for new sentencing powers and
sentencing guidelines. The article concludes by considering further sug-
gestions for more effective enforcement of environmental crime in the
courts, including the introduction of specialist magistrates’ courts and the
use of more fault-based offences or a general defence of due diligence for
environmental crimes.
Keywords Environmental crime; Strict liability; Causation; Magis-
trates’ courts; Sentencing
Environmental offences, along with other regulatory offences, are com-
monly referred to as not truly criminal in nature.1 The perceived lack of
moral blameworthiness for regulatory offences is a significant justifica-
tion for the imposition of strict liability. Due perhaps to the fact that
culpability is not such an issue with environmental offences, the courts
have also taken a different approach to causation than normal in crim-
inal law.2 However, the focus of environmental law has changed signific-
antly over recent times. Whereas initially environmental regulation was
primarily concerned with the threat to public health, the protection of
the environment is now recognised as important to the survival of
mankind. Accompanying this change in focus comes recognition that
serious breaches of environmental regulation should be met with appro-
priately robust sanctions and carry the stigma of criminal conviction.
However, despite high potential penalties, the courts have come under
criticism for the low level of fines imposed, which, it is argued, do not
reflect the cost of non-compliance and do not act as a deterrent.3
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Features of environmental offences
The general water pollution offence provides a good example of a typical
strict liability environmental provision. It is an offence under reg. 38 of
the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010
(SI 2010 No. 675) to contravene reg. 12(1), which states:
A person must not, except under and to the extent authorised by an
environmental permit—
(a) . . .
(b) cause or knowingly permit a water discharge activity or groundwater
activity.
There are two separate offences here, but because of the ease of prose-
cuting the ‘causing’ offence, the ‘knowingly permitting’ offence is rarely
pursued. The only relevant consideration for the court in the former
offence is whether the defendant has caused the entry of the polluting
matter into the water course.4 Similarly worded offences are to be found
in, for example, waste management provisions.5
The decision in the case of R v Dovermoss Lt6 clearly demonstrates that
the thrust of the general water pollution offence7 is not, in fact, upon
pollution, but upon entry of potentially polluting matter. A water supply
was contaminated by ammonia from animal slurry on a nearby field.
The defence argued that the receiving waters had not suffered any harm
and ammonia levels in the water supply did not exceed maximum
concentrations permitted under drinking water regulations. The court
held that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the
substance had actually caused harm, it was sufficient that there was a
likelihood or capability of causing harm to animal or plant life or those
who use water.
Defences to environmental offences tend to be limited and narrowly
interpreted. Again, using the general water pollution offence as an
example, there is a defence for acting under an environmental permit in
reg. 12(1) and there are defences in reg. 40 of EPR 2010 for discharges
from abandoned mines8 and emergency.9 The defence of emergency is
subject to a requirement to minimise harm and report to the regulator
within a reasonable time period.10 This defence has been narrowly
interpreted by the courts and it can be seen from the case of Express Ltd
v Environment Agency11 (one of the rare cases when the defence was
successfully raised) that the element of emergency is not of primary
concern to the court, but rather that the action is done to avoid danger
4 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010
No. 675), Sched. 21 (hereafter ‘EPR 2010’).
5 Environmental Protection Act 1990, Part 2, s. 33(1).
6 [1995] Env LR 258.
7 Then located in s. 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991.
8 EPR 2010, reg. 40(2).
9 EPR 2010, reg. 40(1).
10 EPR 2010, reg. 40(1)(a) and (b). Similar defences can also be found in relation to
waste in EPR 2010, reg. 40, and for nature conservation in the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981, s. 28(8)(b).
11 [2003] Env LR 29.
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to human life or health. This is now reflected in the wording of
reg. 40.
Strict liability
The strict liability nature of most environmental offences is worthy of
further consideration. These are amongst a body of regulatory of-
fences,12 which, from the late part of the 19th century onwards, were
viewed by the courts as not requiring mens rea. There are a number of
reasons advanced for this departure from ‘the foundation of all criminal
justice’13. At the root of it seems to be the lack of stigma accorded to
conviction of these types of offence. Like other ‘technical’14 offences,
environmental crimes have been viewed by the courts as ‘quasi-
criminal’ or malum prohibitum offences.15 Such offences have been
famously described as ‘a class of acts … which are not criminal in any
real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited by
penalty’.16 This is in contrast to the ‘truly criminal’ or ‘serious’ malum in
se offences, such as homicide, where the presumption that mens rea is
required remains, based on the blameworthiness of the perpetrator in
such cases.17 The public interest element of strict liability offences is
another justification.18 These are offences designed to protect the public
good, initially public health and safety and, more latterly, environ-
mental protection, and the need to protect the public justifies conviction
without fault. It is also argued that those who embark on inherently
dangerous activities should accept the potential of criminal responsibil-
ity.19 Defendants are, more often than not, corporations and hence the
personal stigma of conviction is arguably not so significant.20 Also, it is
suggested that companies are in the best position to be able to prevent
and control regulatory wrongdoing.21
Padfield summarised the advantages of strict liability offences for
regulatory crime as being certainty, efficiency and effectiveness.22 In-
deed, one acknowledged reason for the imposition of strict liability lies
in the difficulty for the prosecution of establishing mens rea and the
practical economic problems of so doing.23 Prosecution is simplified and
12 For example, early factory legislation dealing with industrial safety.
13 R v Sleep [1861] 8 Cox CC 472 at 477, per Cockburn CJ.
14 Also referred to as ‘public welfare’ or ‘regulatory’ offences.
15 Pearks, Gunston & Tee Ltd v Ward [1902] 2 KB 1 at 11; London Borough of Harrow v
Shah [1999] 3 All ER 302; Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 149 and 163; Alphacell
Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 at 839 and 848; Simister et al., above n. 1.
D. J. Baker, Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell: London,
2012) 1280.
16 Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 at 922.
17 Gammon Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] 1 AC 1 at 14, Privy Council;
A. Simester, Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005).
18 Ibid.
19 J. G. Murphy and J. L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law (Routledge: 1990) 128.
20 Simester et al., above n. 1; Simester, above n. 17.
21 Ibid.
22 N. Padfield, ‘Clean Water and Muddy Causation: Is Causation a Question of Law
or Fact, or Just a Way of Allocating Blame?’ [1995] Crim LR 683; see also
Simester, above n. 17.
23 As, e.g., with speeding offences.
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evidential problems allayed, of particular importance when defendants
are large corporations.24 Strict liability, it is argued, is an effective com-
pliance tool in the hands of the enforcing body. It acts as a deterrent,
causing operators in high-risk activities to exercise more caution and
thus prevents incidents,25 and it can also be a powerful weapon in
compliance negotiations.
There is a counter-argument that strict liability hinders optimum
enforcement. An alternative view is that when operators find them-
selves liable for accidental occurrences, they are discouraged from inno-
vation and careful operation of their facilities. The level of precautions to
be taken is unknown and, therefore, it is suggested, the minimum
possible preventative measures will be adopted by operators.26 Prosecu-
tion and fines can become business expenses27 and ultimately, it is
suggested that a strict liability regime will lead to grievance on the part
of the regulated and a loss of confidence in the system of control. Some
suggest that this is too high a price to pay for efficiency.28
As noted above, one of the main justifications for regulatory offences
being of strict liability is the lack of stigma involved on conviction.
However, as also observed earlier, environmental crimes arguably at-
tract more stigma in these times of enhanced environmental awareness.
Certainly, sentences of up to 12 months’ imprisonment upon conviction
in the magistrates’ courts and up to five years in the Crown Court
suggest that there is a high level of moral reprehension attached to
environmental crime. Some argue that the use of strict liability in
stigmatic crimes, which may lead to the conviction of the morally
innocent, is unjustified, whereas it may be legitimate in non-stigmatic
offences such as quasi-criminal regulation. It is suggested that the in-
strumental arguments for strict liability in regulatory crime, rehearsed
above, are ‘trumped’ if crimes are stigmatic.29
A third and alternative route has been proposed and this involves the
introduction of negligence as an element of regulatory offences.30 The
enforcing body considers negligence and blame in deciding whether to
prosecute31 and, as will be explored further below, the strict liability
nature of the offences and blameworthiness of defendants can be factors
in the determination of sentence. Thus, it is argued that negligence
should also be considered by the courts in determining guilt.32 In the
light of the introduction of civil sanctions for some environmental
offences and the serious nature of those that come before the courts,
24 Simester et al., above n. 1.
25 Ibid.; Simester, above n. 17.
26 Simester, above n. 17.
27 Baker, above n. 15 at 1274.
28 Ibid. at 1269.
29 Simester, above n. 17.
30 Ibid.
31 N. Stanley, ‘The Empress Decision and Causing Water Pollution: A New Approach
to s. 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991 Strict Liability’ (1999) Water Law 41.
32 Baker, above n. 15 at 1273.
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there are, perhaps, arguments for revisiting the strict liability nature of
such offences and these will be returned to in the conclusions and
recommendations of this article.
Causation
The courts have also taken a different approach to causation in cases of
environmental pollution. The traditional two-stage approach requires
first the consideration of ‘factual causation’ by means of the application
of the ‘but for’ test. The result may, however, be unsatisfactory and lead
to the conviction of the morally innocent.33 Indeed, it is suggested that
this first test is not a variety of causation at all, but merely an ‘indicum
of causal relationships, a convenient proxy’.34 The courts then proceed
to consider ‘legal causation’. The additional test was developed because
of the reluctance to convict, particularly of homicide, those who are not
blameworthy.35 Glanville Williams considers this second step not to be a
test of causation either, but a moral reaction and prefers reference to
imputability, responsibility or blameworthiness.36 Others acknowledge
that legal causation represents a value judgement,37 which takes ac-
count of policy and the social context of the time.38 In legal causation,
the requirement is for there to be a culpable act, which must have
caused the result; this must be more than a minimal cause and there
must be no novus actus interveniens that breaks the chain of causation.39
The need for ‘outcome responsibility’ is central to legal causation.40 This
is the ‘cardinal principle that a person is primarily responsible only for
what he himself does or incites’,41 which was well illustrated in the case
of R v Kennedy (No. 2).42
In cases of pollution, it is argued that a different value judgement is
involved. The purpose here is to make the polluter pay and not to
allocate blame.43 Perhaps as a reflection of this, the courts have deviated
from the central principle of outcome responsibility and have taken a
different approach to omissions as well as to intervening acts. This can be
recognised in the landmark water pollution case of Alphacell Ltd v
Woodward.44 Alphacell Ltd manufactured paper at a riverside site. The
water used to wash the raw materials was stored in tanks with a pump
33 Padfield, above n. 22 at 684.
34 A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan, ‘Being There’ [2012] 71 Camb LJ 29.
35 Padfield, above n. 22 at 683.
36 Baker, above n. 15 at 199.
37 Padfield, above n. 22 at 685.
38 A. Norrie, ‘A Critique of Criminal Causation’ (1999) 54 MLR 701.
39 Padfield, above n. 22 at 684–5.
40 P. Cane and J. Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility: Essays in Honour of Tony
Honoré (Hart: Oxford, 2001).
41 Baker, above n. 15 at 217; R v Tilley (2009) 173 JP 393.
42 [2007] UKHL 38, [2008] 1 AC 269.
43 Padfield, above n. 22 at 686.
44 [1972] AC 824.
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that automatically switched on when the water reached a predeter-
mined level, thus preventing overflow from the tanks into the river. The
tanks and pump were regularly inspected. but nonetheless the pump
failed to operate on one occasion due to obstruction by vegetation, and
polluting effluent flowed into the river. The company was not aware of
the entry of the effluent into the watercourse. It appealed against its
conviction to the House of Lords on the basis that the offence required
some element of recklessness, negligence or intention, which was ab-
sent. In dismissing the appeal, as well as affirming the strict liability
nature of the offence, their Lordships concluded that ‘causing’ was to be
determined by looking at the facts alongside the ordinary meaning of the
word ‘cause’. Despite Lord Wilberforce seeking ‘proper attribution of
responsibility’,45 this clearly differs from the principle of ‘outcome re-
sponsibility’ alluded to above.
A number of cases followed where the courts moved away slightly
from the approach taken in Alphacell, in finding defendants, who had
been passive, not guilty of the general water pollution offence.46 The
Alphacell position was reaffirmed in the controversial case of Environment
Agency v Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd.47 Empress, a car sales company,
stored red diesel in a tank on their premises. There was a protective bund
surrounding the tank, but this had been overridden by the company. An
unknown person entered the premises and opened the tap on the tank
allowing its entire contents to flow through a storm drain into a nearby
watercourse. On appeal, counsel for the appellant company argued that
there had been no positive act, which amounted to ‘causing’ the entry as
it had, in fact, been the act of a stranger. Dismissing the appeal, the
House of Lords made clear that ‘causing’, for the purposes of the general
water pollution offence, could take place with or without the occurrence
of other facts, which produced a situation in which the polluting matter
could escape. The question was whether this was an ordinary fact of life
or something extraordinary and this was one to which the courts had to
apply common sense and knowledge of what happens in the area. This
returns us to the position of Alphacell and the requirement merely for an
‘active operation’. In effect liability in water pollution cases can arise for
omissions and also the normal approach in criminal law, whereby a
voluntary human act amounts to a novus actus interveniens, can be set
aside.
The decision in Empress has been widely criticised. Lord Hoffmann’s
judgment48 proposes that there are in fact no general principles of
causation, thus making the matter just one of statutory interpretation.
Critics suggest that this jeopardises any stable doctrine of causation as
45 Above n. 44 at 835.
46 Price v Cromack [1975] 1 WLR 988; Wychavon District Council v National Rivers
Authority [1993] 1 WLR 125; National Rivers Authority v Welsh Development Agency
[1993] Env LR 407.
47 [1999] 2 AC 22.
48 Ibid. at 29 et seq.; cited in R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552.
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different causal responsibilities will apply to different crimes.49 Simester
et al. assert that the leading judgment of Lord Hoffmann is ‘profoundly
unsatisfactory’50 and wrong in principle having ‘trampled upon a funda-
mental precept of criminal law’51 (that an individual is responsible for
his or her own autonomous actions and not for those of others).
Nonetheless, it seems, for the moment, and for water pollution offences
at least,52 that a deviation exists from some of the generally accepted
principles of criminal law. The approach taken to causation in pollution
cases, coupled with the strict liability nature of the offences, may well be
influential in sentencing patterns in the lower courts.
Environmental crime in the courts
Most environmental prosecutions are brought by the Environment
Agency in the magistrates’ courts. The number of environmental prose-
cutions has always been low and (as can be seen in Table 1 below)
actually fell quite significantly in the period from 2005–2010.
Prior to the formation of the Environment Agency in 1996, the low
number of prosecutions was explained by the informal regulatory style,
adopted by the individual agencies that preceded its establishment.53
The Environment Agency also adopts a compliance approach, but along-
side this has displayed a greater willingness to bring certain offenders to
court. There was a rise in the number of prosecutions brought and a year
on year increase immediately following the establishment of the
Agency.54 Nonetheless the number of prosecutions remains relatively
49 G. R. Sullivan and A. P. Simester, ‘Causation Without Limits: Causing Death While
Driving Without a Licence, While Disqualified, or Without Insurance’ [2012] Crim
LR 753.
50 Simester et al., above n. 1.
51 Ibid.
52 See also the offence of causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or
uninsured: Sullivan and Simester, above n. 49; R v Williams [2011] Crim LR 468 at
471–2, commentary by D. Ormerod.
53 Hawkins, above n. 1; D. Vogel, National Styles of Regulation (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 1986).
54 Dupont and Zakkour, above n. 3.
Table 1. Statistics from National Enforcement Database
Year Prosecutions
2005 887
2006 744
2007 808
2008 722
2009 671
2010 653
2011 694
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small as illustrated by recent statistics from the Environment Agency on
water pollution incidents and prosecutions in Table 2 below.
Enforcement in the magistrates’ courts
For most environmental offences, there is an upper limit of fine in the
magistrates’ courts of £50,000 along with the option of imprisonment
for a period of up to 12 months. Fines in the Crown Court are unlimited
and magistrates are encouraged to refer to the Crown Court for sentenc-
ing where their sentencing powers are insufficient.55 There have been a
number of studies of the sentencing patterns of magistrate’s courts over
the years, all of which present the same picture of fairly low levels of
average fines.56 Figures from the Environment Agency show an average
fine for organisations across all courts (magistrates’ courts and Crown
Court) in England and Wales of around £8,000 and the Agency notes
that there has been in the region of a 5 per cent increase in these average
fine levels annually.57 Custodial sentences are extremely rare.58
There has been long-standing criticism of the level of penalties in the
magistrates’ courts for environmental offences and there is a consider-
able body of opinion that regards fines as being too low.59 The Environ-
ment Agency has consistently voiced its frustration at the level of fines
imposed60 and, in the majority of cases, the financial penalties do not
55 Sentencing Council, Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines (2008) as updated,
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/guidelines/guidelines-to-
download.htm, accessed 16 April 2013; Magistrates’ Association, P. Stookes (ed.),
Costing the Earth: Guidance for Sentencers, October 2003.
56 For example, Dupont and Zakkour, above n. 3.
57 D. Stott, ‘Environmental Enforcement in the UK’ (2009) 11 Journal of
Environmental Monitoring 470–4.
58 Dupont and Zakkour, above n. 3; C. Hatton, P. Castle and M. Day, ‘The
Environment and the Law—Does our Legal System Deliver Access to Justice? A
Review’ (2004) 6 Env L Rev 240.
59 See, e.g., House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, ‘Environmental
Crime and the Courts: Sixth Report of Session 2003–04’, HC 126, May 2004 10;
P. Hampton, ‘Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and
Enforcement’, March 2005, HM Treasury; Dupont and Zakour, above n. 3; Hatton
et al., above n. 58.
60 See, e.g., Environment Agency, ‘Spotlight on Business, Environmental
Performance in 2005: The Environment What’s In It for You?’, July 2006.
Table 2. Water quality incidents and prosecutions, National
Enforcement Database
Year Incidents Prosecutions
2010 9285 125
2011 9176 120
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reflect the economic benefit derived from non-compliance and conse-
quently do not act as a deterrent.61 There are a number of explanations
advanced as to why the level of fines in the magistrates’ courts is low.
The traditional explanation centres on the inexperience of magistrates’
courts with environmental offences. The argument is that a vicious
circle occurs whereby most offences are not prosecuted; magistrates,
therefore, gain little experience and deliver lenient sentences62. The low
sentences, in turn, discourage the regulatory body from bringing prose-
cutions.63 Watson suggests that: ‘If prosecutions became more common
magistrates would be better equipped to treat environmental offences as
serious crimes.’64 There is some irony in the argument that the low level
of fines for environmental offences, so frequently criticised by the
Environment Agency, is, in fact, caused by the reluctance of the regu-
latory body to prosecute. Those who suggest that the Agency is applying
‘the realistic prospect of conviction’ test too rigidly look to the Agency’s
95 per cent success rate in prosecutions to support their argument.65 The
Environment Agency, on the other hand, denies any reluctance to bring
prosecutions and maintains that it is concentrating resources on behavi-
our that represents the greatest risk to the environment.66 It should,
however, be noted that the strict liability nature of most environmental
offences (discussed above) is, no doubt, instrumental in the high per-
centage rate of successful prosecutions.
There is no doubt that, amongst their routine business, lay magis-
trates encounter barely any cases of environmental crime. Environ-
mental cases can also be extremely complex and technical, often
involving evidential material on industrial processes, pollutants and
pathways,67 which, together with their unfamiliarity, must surely cause
problems for magistrates. Magistrates do, of course, benefit from the
assistance of their legal advisers and have some degree of guidance.68
However, unlike other criminal offences, there are, as yet, no published
tariff guidelines for environmental offences. Despite the recommenda-
tion of the Sentencing Advisory Panel, in 2000,69 the Court of Appeal
declined to issue tariff guidelines.70 There have been recommendations
61 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, above n. 59; Hampton,
above n. 59.
62 Dupont and Zakkour, above n. 3; T. Moran, ‘Magistrates’ Courts and
Environmental Regulators—Attitudes and Opportunities’ (2005) 4 Journal of
Environmental Health Research 25.
63 Dupont and Zakkour, above n. 3; Moran, above n. 62; M. Watson, ‘Low Fines for
Environmental Offences? Blame the Regulators Not the Courts’ (2003) 167 JP 50.
64 Watson, above n. 63.
65 Ibid.; Moran, above n. 62.
66 D. Stott, ‘Low Fines for Environmental Blame the Regulators Not the Courts’
(2003) 167 JP 235 (in response to Watson, above n. 63).
67 N. Parpworth, ‘Section 34(1)(b) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990: The
Scope of the Offence’ (2007) 171 JP 33.
68 Sentencing Council, above n. 55.
69 Sentencing Advisory Panel, M. Wasik (Chair), ‘Environmental Offences: The
Panel’s Advice to the Court of Appeal’, March 2000, 1.
70 The opportunity arose in Environment Agency v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea
Empress) [2000] 2 Cr App R (S) 423.
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to the Sentencing Guidelines Council over the years to publish guide-
lines for all cases of regulatory non- compliance71 and academic com-
mentators have echoed the call.72 The Sentencing Council has
commenced work on a draft guideline for environmental offences and
an environmental offences guideline consultation is running from
March 2013 to June 2013, so this is one area where it is hoped further
assistance will soon be available to the lower courts.
The factors alluded to above have led commentators to doubt the
suitability of the criminal courts as a venue for dealing with environ-
mental cases and over the years there have been repeated calls for
matters relating to environmental law to be dealt with in a ‘stand-alone’
environmental court. This proposition has, in the past, been supported
by key members of the judiciary73 and proponents of an environmental
court have looked to the Land and Environment Court of New South
Wales as an operational example. There have, however, been mixed
views as to the success of the New South Wales project and its potential
for application in this country.74 Support for the idea of an environ-
mental court reached its peak early this century and there is now less
enthusiasm for the notion.75
There have also been arguments in favour of a new environmental
tribunal to handle regulatory appeals under environmental legislation.76
Fresh momentum for this latter proposal flows from the creation of the
First-tier Tribunal (Environment) set up to deal with appeals against civil
sanctions deriving from Part 3 of the Regulatory Enforcement and
Sanctions Act 2008. Another suggestion advanced to tackle the problem
of under-enforcement in the magistrates’ courts is the creation of spe-
cially designated courts, within the existing court system. Alternatively,
either district judges or lay magistrates specifically trained to hear
environmental cases could be employed within the existing magistrates’
court framework.77 These ideas formed part of the recommendations of
both the Environmental Audit Committee78 and the Environmental
71 R. Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective, Final Report’, Cabinet
Office, November 2006.
72 See, e.g., N. Parpworth ‘Environmental Offences: The Need for Sentencing
Guidelines in the Crown Court’ (2008) 1 Journal of Planning and Environment Law
18.
73 Lord Woolf, ‘Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?’ (1992) 4 Journal of
Environmental Law 12; R. Carnwath, ‘Environmental Enforcement: The Need for a
Specialist Court’ [1992] JPL 799.
74 M. Day, R. Stein and W. Birtles, ‘An Environmental Court—Part 2’ (2001) 151
NLJ 697; P. Ryan, ‘Court of Hope and False Expectation: Land and Environment
Court 21 Years On’ (2002) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 301; P. L. Stein,
‘Specialist Environmental Courts: The Land and Environment Court of New South
Wales, Australia’ (2002) 4 Env L Rev 5.
75 Lord Justice Carnwarth, ‘Judicial Protection of the Environment: At Home and
Abroad’ (2004) 16 Journal of Environmental Law 326.
76 R. Macrory, ‘Consistency and Effectiveness: Strengthening the New Environment
Tribunal’, January 2011, Centre for Law and the Environment, University College
London.
77 R. Malcolm, ‘Prosecuting for Environmental Crime: Does Crime Pay?’ (2002) 14
Environmental Law and Management 4.
78 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, above n. 59 at 10.
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Justice Project of 200479 and are supported by the Environment Agency
and some academic commentators.80 A similar model is adopted for
health and safety prosecutions, which are brought to a single magis-
trates’ court in a particular region.
Perceptions of environmental crime
There is another factor to consider when looking at sentencing patterns
for environmental offences and this is the perception of environmental
crime by the public, magistrates and higher courts. It has been noted
above that strict liability offences are often viewed as ‘quasi-criminal’
and there is an argument that the public and lay magistrates look upon
environmental crime, like white-collar crime, as not as morally culpable
as criminal activities such as assault or burglary.81 This perception per-
haps ignores the development in environmental awareness over the
past three or four decades. The emphasis in early environmental protec-
tion provisions was primarily upon the protection of public health from
environmental pollution. This can be recognised in the judgments of the
courts as, for example, in Alphacell when Lord Salmon reflected upon
the consequences in terms of river water quality if water pollution
offences went unpunished: ‘As a result, many rivers which are now
filthy would become filthier still and many rivers which are now clean
would lose their cleanliness.’82
However, the recognition in more recent years of an eco-system
approach to environmental protection and the imperative of climate
change have changed understanding of environmental damage from a
potential threat to individual human health to a threat to the survival of
the human race. As Sedley LJ has stated:
. . . environmental crime, if established, strikes not only at a locality and its
population, but in some measure too at the planet and its future. Nobody
should be allowed to doubt its seriousness.83
This recognition of the seriousness of environmental damage is reflected
in the high upper limits for fine and sentence in the courts.84 It seems
likely, however, that lay magistrates and members of the judiciary who
do not subscribe to the view that environmental crime is serious and
continue to distinguish environmental offences from the activities of
‘true criminality’85 will not consider high penalties to be appropriate.86
The strict liability nature of the offences in itself, coupled with the novel
approach to causation and accompanying arguments in mitigation from
79 Hatton et al., above n. 58.
80 P. De Prez, ‘Excuses, Excuses: The Ritual Trivialisation of Environmental
Prosecutions’ (2000) 12 Journal of Environmental Law 65; Malcolm, above n. 77;
J. Bates, ‘Examining Water Pollution Law and Regulation in Light of Current
Government and EU Policy’ (1997), paper presented at Water Law Conference,
London, February 1998.
81 Hawkins, above n. 1; Grekos, above n. 1.
82 [1972] AC 824.
83 Magistrates’ Association, above n. 55, Foreword.
84 Hawkins, above n. 1; Grekos, above n. 1.
85 Malcolm, above n. 77.
86 Moran, above n. 62; De Prez, above n. 80.
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the defence,87 may also influence the courts in their sentencing.88 In-
deed, this was acknowledged in the Court of Appeal in R v Yorkshire
Water Services Ltd89 where fines of £50,000 and £25,000 were reduced to
£10,000 and £5,000 respectively because the appellant’s plea had been
put forward and accepted on the basis of strict liability.
Civil sanctions
Prosecution is, of course, only one of a range of enforcement alternatives
and the Environment Agency has long had other enforcement powers
available.90 A suggestion raised by some critics of strict liability regu-
latory offences has been to make administrative penalties available for
low-level regulatory crime.91 Two influential reviews in 200592 and
200693 eventually led to the provisions to be found in Part 3 of the
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 creating civil sanctions
for regulatory offences.
An Order was made in 201094 applying the relevant section of the
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to a number of
environmental offences and the Environment Agency started using civil
sanctions in January 2011. The sanctions available include both fixed
and variable monetary penalties as well as a range of new notices.95 The
provisions also allow for enforcement undertakings to be agreed. These
administrative sanctions are, at the moment, limited to a fairly small
number of offences and, where applicable, not all of them are avail-
able.96 The Agency must be satisfied ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that the
person committed the offence in order to use the new powers. There is
a right of appeal on specific grounds such as error of fact to the new First-
tier Tribunal (Environment), established pursuant to the Tribunals
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Accompanying and aligned to the
new powers is a new Environment Agency enforcement and prosecu-
tion policy, which aims to focus on both ‘customer’ and ‘outcome’.97
The introduction of civil sanctions has not been without criticism98
and the extension of sanctions to environmental permitting offences,
originally due to have taken place in April 2011, has been delayed,
87 Above n. 86
88 Ibid.
89 [2002] Env LR 18.
90 For example, enforcement notices, suspension, revocation and variation of
permits.
91 Padfield, above n. 22; Baker, above n. 15.
92 P. Hampton, ‘Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and
Enforcement’, HM Treasury, March 2005.
93 Macrory, above n. 71.
94 Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order 2010 (SI 2010 No. 1157), in force
on 6 April 2010.
95 Compliance notices, restoration notices and stop notices.
96 DEFRA, Guidance on the Application of Civil Sanctions, Annex 1.
97 Environment Agency, Enforcement and Sanctions Statement, Guidance and
Offence Response Options, available at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/
business/regulation/31851.aspx, accessed 16 April 2013.
98 See, e.g., J. Black, ‘Tensions in the Regulatory State’ [2007] PL 67, J. Maurici,
‘Rethinking Regulatory Sanctions—Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act
2008—An Exchange of Letters’ (2009) 21 Environmental Law and Management 183.
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pending a cross-government review. This followed representations by
the Minister for Government Policy that the idea of regulators imposing
sanctions directly without recourse to the courts was ‘intolerable’ and
would lead to ‘sloppy regulation’.99 Academics and practitioners have
also raised concerns over the enforcing body making decisions on crim-
inal offences and potentially significant penalties and the appropriate-
ness of removing this element of the administration of justice from the
courts.100 Another fear is that the employment of civil sanctions will
reinforce the idea that environmental offences are less serious than
traditional crime and herald the beginning of the decriminalisation of
environmental offences.101
It should be noted, however, that similar powers have existed with
regulators for many years, both in the environmental sphere102 and
other areas of UK regulatory law.103 Overseas jurisdictions also utilise
administrative penalties as well as the criminal law.104 It is also sig-
nificant, in countering such concerns, that the 2008 Act does provide
strong protection against regulator abuse105 and revenue collected
through monetary penalties goes into a consolidated fund and is not
available to the regulators. Proponents of civil penalties point to the fact
that alternatives exist therein for less heavy-handed and more cost-
effective enforcement as well as the capacity to respond quickly to
emergency situations and the technical expertise, with the regulatory
body, which will enable a more proportionate response.106 To date the
only civil sanctions activity has been in the acceptance of enforcement
undertakings and this has been almost exclusively in the area of waste
regulation, particularly waste packaging offences.107 It is, thus, too early
to judge the success or impact of the new powers. However, it should be
remembered that the intention was that civil sanctions should be an
additional tool, and not a substitute for criminal prosecution.
New sentencing powers
It is all too often overlooked in the discussion of the introduction of civil
sanctions, that the recommendations of Macrory on the implementation
of administrative alternatives to prosecution were accompanied with
99 Oliver Letwin as reported in ENDS Report, 7 April 2011, available at http://www.
endsreport.com/27656, accessed 18 April 2013. 
100 See, e.g., Black, above n. 97; Maurici, above n. 98.
101 Ibid.
102 For example, enforcement notices and fixed penalties for littering.
103 For example, financial services and utilities; R. Macrory, ‘Rethinking Regulatory
Sanctions—Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008—An Exchange of
Letters’ (2009) 21 Environmental Law and Management 183.
104 For example, Australia, Canada and the United States; Macrory, above n. 102.
105 The requirement for the regulator to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an
offence has been committed in s. 39(2) and s. 42(2). The serving of notices and
the opportunity for representations and the right of appeal to the independent
First-tier tribunal (s. 40(6) and s. 43(7)).
106 C. Abbot, ‘The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008’ (2009) 11
Environmental Law Review 38.
107 All for offences under the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste)
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007 No. 871).
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proposals for the strengthening and extension of the range of sentencing
powers available to the courts. Macrory recommended the introduction
of profits orders, corporate rehabilitation orders, publicity orders and
community project orders in addition to the sentencing powers already
available to the courts for environmental offences.108 The DEFRA Better
Environmental Enforcement Project that consulted on the introduction
of civil sanctions under the 2008 Act, as well as concluding that civil
sanctions would help create ‘a better graduated system of enforcement’,
also contained outline proposals to strengthen sentencing powers for
those very serious cases which would still come to be prosecuted.
DEFRA states that the government is looking to introduce new powers
‘to assist the courts in structured proportionate and effective sentencing
of the especially serious environmental offences . . .’.109
Publicity and profit orders as well as environmental service orders,
environmental audit orders and corporate rehabilitation orders are all
under consideration.
Conclusions and recommendations
As noted above the recently introduced civil sanctions are, at the
moment, very limited in their availability. Also, they do not replace low-
level criminal offences, but merely offer alternatives to criminal pro-
secution. Strict liability environmental offences can still be prosecuted in
the courts and the relaxed approach to the requirement for legal causa-
tion for the moment remains in place for environmental crime. The
introduction of civil sanctions may well lead to more effective enforce-
ment by the regulator without the need to bring some incidents to the
magistrates’ courts, although this waits to be seen. Cases of a more
serious nature will continue to be heard in the magistrates’ courts and
higher courts and the likelihood remains of low level and, arguably,
inappropriate sentences.
The introduction of new sentencing powers would assist in allowing
magistrates to sentence appropriately and proportionally and serve to
provide more effective deterrents to those who engage in environmental
crime. It is also vital that sentencing guidelines are available to the lower
courts as they are with other areas of criminal activity. The Environment
Agency’s view is that the lack of specific criteria for sentencing is one of
the major reasons for disparity in sentencing across magistrates’
courts110 and early action by the Sentencing Council in publishing
guidelines for environmental offences would be widely welcomed.
However, the complexity of environmental prosecutions remains and
the inexperience of lay magistrates together with a low level of training
may well continue to present problems with enforcement in the magis-
trates’ courts. Perhaps, fresh attention should be given to the possibility
of either a number of specialist magistrates’ courts across the country or
108 Macrory, above n. 71.
109 Fairer and Better Environmental Enforcement—Government Response to
Consultation, DEFRA, February 2010. 
110 Stott, above n. 66.
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specially trained district judges or lay magistrates to constitute the bench
for environmental offences. If powers of sentencing are widened, then
there is yet more argument for experienced and adequately trained legal
personnel to be able to administer appropriate and proportionate deter-
rent sentences. Resources for training magistrates are limited, and this
proposal would have the benefit of targeting these scarce resources to
best effect. There is a proven model in operation for health and safety
offences, which could be successfully emulated for dealing with
environmental crime.
The serious nature of environmental crime, acknowledged by many
and reflected in the high level of upper limit penalties in the courts, does
not sit comfortably with the strict liability of most environmental of-
fences. One of the main justifications for the imposition of strict liability
is that it is suited to low-level, less blameworthy offences which carry
little stigma. Indeed, there are those that draw the line for strict liability
at the point where offences attract a potential penalty of imprison-
ment.111 Arguably, environmental offences nowadays are not only
viewed as serious, but the stigma that they attract, even for companies,
is much greater than in the past. This is a serious matter for the
reputation of corporate entities, which can be severely damaged by an
environmental incident and attendant publicity and which can bear
significant financial consequences.112
Some of the consultation responses to Professor Macrory’s 2006
review supported the prospect of decriminalising certain regulatory
offences entirely and reserving criminal sanctions for only the most
serious cases of regulatory non-compliance.113 The Macrory review did
not consider the status of current offences and this area was taken up
more recently in a consultation by the Law Commission.114 The Law
Commission proposed that low-level regulatory offences should be re-
pealed and only those offences serious enough to attract either a prison
sentence or an unlimited fine should be regarded as serious enough to
warrant criminalisation. They further proposed that low-level offences
are replaced by the introduction of a civil penalty or equivalent meas-
ure.115 With those criminal offences that remain, the Law Commission
suggested that the fault element116 should be proportionate to the risk of
harm, with higher level fault requirements where the risk of harm is
remote.117 There is a clear movement here away from the current, strict
liability, status of most environmental offences. Furthermore, the Law
Commission proposed a power for the courts to apply a due diligence
defence to any statutory offence that does not require proof of
fault.118
111 Baker, above n. 15 at 1280; Simester et al., above n. 1 at 175.
112 For example, BP with the recent Gulf of Mexico oil pollution incident.
113 Macrory, above n. 71 at para. 1.39.
114 Law Commission, Law Com. Consultation Paper No. 195, Criminal Liability in
Regulatory Contexts (2010).
115 Ibid. at 8.
116 Such as dishonesty, intention, knowledge or recklessness.
117 Law Commission, above n. 114 at 13.
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The UK Environmental Law Association (UKELA), in response to the
Law Commission consultation,119 did not favour the decriminalisation of
low-level environmental offences. It pointed to the fact that existing
offences do not naturally fall into serious or non-serious categories and
it preferred civil sanctions as an alternative rather than a replacement.
Simester also recognised the difficulty of drawing the line between those
offences which carry stigma and those that do not in his consideration of
restricting strict liability to stigmatic crimes.120 UKELA further pointed
out that decriminalisation may fall foul of the Environmental Crime
Directive,121 which requires certain environmental activities to be sub-
ject to criminal offences. In respect of the recommendation for a general
defence of due diligence, they consider that further evidence and debate
is necessary before such a defence be introduced for all environmental
offences.
In the light of the introduction of civil sanctions and changing percep-
tions of environmental crime, it is perhaps time to open up the debate
with regards to the nature of environmental offences. The introduction
of more fault-based offences and a general due diligence defence could
go towards reinforcing the seriousness of environmental crime and
ensuring that perpetrators are appropriately and proportionally pun-
ished. It may also be the case, that the higher courts, when next faced
with a case such as Empress may (particularly in the light of Kennedy
No. 2) take a more traditional approach to legal causation, thus bringing
pollution offences into line.
The view that environmental crime is not ‘real crime’ is grounded in
the belief that it does not generally result in direct harm to the individual
or threaten social stability.122 This may well be the case, but environ-
mental law seeks to address an even greater challenge, to the survival of
society itself. As Hatton et al. point out:
Environmental law carries a responsibility to ensure justice not only for the
individual citizen, but for the collective benefit of our environment—both
now and for future generations.123
If the courts do not respond with appropriate and substantial penalties
for the most serious incidents, then the view that environmental wrongs
are not worthy of society’s condemnation will prevail and justice will
not be done to the environment or society.
119 UKELA, UKELA’s Response to Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 195: Criminal
Liability in Regulatory Contexts, November 2010, available at http://www.ukela.org/
content/doclib/193.pdf, accessed 18 April 2013.
120 Simester, above n. 17.
121 Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law
(OJ No. L328|28, 6 December 2008).
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